A recent case,
Baur v. Comr., T.C. Memo 2014-117, demonstrates why, sometimes, the tax law doesn’t provide a reset button. If we don’t get it right the first time, we lose, and we cannot pretend that we have won. Though it is unfortunate that minimizing adverse tax consequences requires careful examination of much of what we say, do, write, and sign, that’s the way it is, and until it changes, we can either scrutinize our transactions at the outset or suffer the consequences of not being permitted to change the facts after the fact.
In Baur, the taxpayer and his wife were divorced after 27 years of marriage. The divorce decree incorporated a marital settlement agreement into which the taxpayer and his wife had entered. Under the agreement, the taxpayer agreed to pay his ex-wife, as unallocated maintenance and child support, $3,750 per month. He also agreed to pay 45% of any and all net bonuses and commissions that he received. The payments were to terminate upon the earlier of the ex-wife’s death, the taxpayer’s death, the ex-wife’s remarriage, or the ex-wife’s cohabitation with an unrelated person on a continuing conjugal basis. The agreement provided that if one of the children is emancipated or one of the other children lives independently or outside the ex-wife’s residence without financial support from the ex-wife, then the unallocated support payment would be modified to $1,800 per month, subject to review upon petition by either party. The agreement also provided that the amounts paid by the taxpayer “are acknowledged to be paid incident to the Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage and in discharge of [taxpayer’s] legal obligation to support [the ex-wife, and that the] sums shall be includable in the gross income of [the ex-wife] and deductible from the gross income of [the taxpayer] within the meaning and intent of Sections 71 and 215 of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, The Tax Reform Acts of 1984 and 1986, as amended, or of any identical or comparable provision of a federal revenue code hereinafter enacted or modified.” The agreement provided that the “parties expressly state that they have freely and voluntarily entered into this Agreement of their own volition, free from any duress or coercion and with full knowledge of each and every provision contained in this Agreement and the consequences thereof.”
During 2010, the taxpayer paid $45,000.02 to his ex-wife as unallocated maintenance and child support, but did not pay any portion of a bonus that he had received. On his 2010 federal income tax return, the taxpayer deducted $41,695 as alimony paid, later explaining that he intended to deduct $45,000 but erroneously deducted the $41,695 amount. In June 2012, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer, disallowing $26,143 of the deduction and allowing $15,552 of it, though on brief the IRS increased the amount it allowed to $17,981.89. In September 2012, the court that has issued the divorce decree issued an order that stated, “[T]he provision in the Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage concerning unallocated support is intended to be maintenance, for the support of [the ex-wife],” that the payments that had been made “have been and continue to be maintenance to [the ex-wife], that it was the court’s intent that the payments are to be includible in the ex-wife’s gross income and deductible by the taxpayer, that the inclusion of the paragraph concerning emancipation and financial independence of the children was a scrivener order, was not intended to be part of the decree, and should be vitiated nunc pro tunc.
The Tax Court, after setting out the basic rules of section 71(a), explained that section 71(c)(1) excludes from the definition of alimony and separate maintenance payments any part of a payment which the terms of the divorce or separation instrument fix as a sum payable for support of the payor spouse’s children., and that section 71(c)(2) provides that if any amount specified in a divorce or separation instrument is to be reduced upon the occurrence of a contingency specified in the instrument relating to a child, such as attaining a specified age, marrying, dying, leaving school, or a similar contingency. or at a time that can clearly be associated with that kind of contingency, an amount equal to the amount of the reduction is treated as an amount fixed for child support.
Because the paragraph dealing with the emancipation or financial independence of the children falls within section 71(c)(2), the court was required to determine whether that paragraph was operative for tax purposes. The taxpayer argued that the state court’s September order made the paragraph retroactively inapplicable. The Tax Court relied on previous decisions holding that the definition of alimony and separate maintenance payments rests on the text of section 71 and not the intent of the parties to the divorce or the state court, and that state court orders retroactively redesignating payments as alimony and not child support, or vice versa, are disregarded unless the retroactive order corrects a divorce decree that at the time issue mistakenly failed to reflect the intention of the court at the time of the original order.
The Tax Court pointed out that the divorce decree incorporated the marital settlement agreement, and that the agreement was “freely and voluntarily entered into” by the spouses “with full knowledge of each and every provision contained in this Agreement and the consequences thereof.” The agreement unambiguously provided in the paragraph in question for a reduction in payments based upon particular contingencies related to the children. The Tax Court rejected the state court’s statement that the paragraph in question was not intended to be part of the divorce decree and was a scrivener’s error. The Tax Court took note of the fact that the state court issued its September order only after the taxpayer received the notice of deficiency from the IRS, and concluded that inclusion of the paragraph in the marital settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree was not an error.
The taxpayer’s deduction was limited to what the IRS allowed. The Tax Court also held that the imposition by the IRS of the section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty would be sustained if, after the recomputation of the taxpayer’s tax liability to reflect the reduction of the alimony deduction, there is an understatement of the taxpayer’s 2010 tax liability that exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax required to be shown or $5,000.
The lesson to be learned is that tax consequences need to analyzed before the fact, and not after the transaction has been completed. Often, I tell my students, “Some clients will give you a chance to help you out by talking with you before they do something, but many others will not. It’s from the latter group that comes the pressure to backdate documents, hide facts, invent facts, and otherwise try to make things appear other than as they are.” It’s easy to forget that the tax law casts a shadow over pretty much everything, and it must be given its attention sooner rather than later.