Two recent Tax Court cases, published on the same day, illustrate the need for taxpayers to be careful when planning how to work out the economic effects of a divorce. Though the rules are fairly straight-forward, as tax rules go, it is easy to get into trouble, especially when alterations are made without thinking through all of the consequences.
In one case,
Mehriary v. Comr., T.C. Memo 2015-126, the taxpayer and her eventual former husband agreed that he would have exclusive use, ownership, and possession of one of their residences, on Morton Road in New Bern, North Carolina, and that she would take their residence on Sweet Briar Road in the same town. He quitclaimed his interest in the Sweet Briar property to the taxpayer. They also agreed that the taxpayer would pay alimony to her former husband, in the amount of $4,000 each month for 60 months. These payments would be made to the bank holding the mortgage on the Morton property, and if the mortgage loan was paid in full, remaining payments would be made to the former husband. The agreement “advised the parties to seek the opinion and advice of a tax professional as to the tax ramifications of the agreement.” Subsequently, the taxpayer proposed a modification, under which the taxpayer would quitclaim the Sweet Briar property to her former husband in lieu of $80,000 of the alimony obligation, and he agreed. The taxpayer quitclaimed the property in February 2011, and in September 2011 requested the local court to modify the divorce decree to reflect the modification. The taxpayer deducted an $80,000 loss on her 2011 federal income tax return for the transfer of the Sweet Briar property, explaining at trial that she did so because her insurance company had characterized that property as an investment property.
The Tax Court held that the transfer of the Sweet Briar property was a transfer of property between former spouses incident to a divorce, and thus under section 1041 no gain or loss was permitted to be recognized by the taxpayer. The Tax Court also held that the taxpayer’s attempt to characterize the transfer as a deductible alimony payment failed because the transfer was not in cash, as required by section 71. Finally, the Tax Court upheld the imposition of a section 6662 accuracy-related penalty, pointing out, among other things, that the taxpayer had been advised to seek a tax professional’s opinion but that she did not introduce any evidence that she relied on professional tax advice.
In the other case,
Muniz v. Comr., T.C. Memo 2015-125, the taxpayer and his eventual former wife agreed that he would pay alimony to her, along with $409 per month to cover health insurance for her and her son, followed by the lesser of $500 or the cost of health insurance for nine months. The former wife waived all rights to any other alimony payments. The parties then agreed to an order requiring the taxpayer to pay her $6,000 in satisfaction of the alimony obligation under the first agreement, and the taxpayer did so. The court reserved ruling on her request for attorney fees and costs. Subsequently, the court ordered the taxpayer to pay $45,000 to his former wife, which she characterized at trial as a settlement for attorney fees and division of marital assets. The taxpayer paid the $45,000, and deducted the payment. His former wife did not include it in gross income. The taxpayer is a licensed attorney, and also holds a CPA license which at some point he put on inactive status.
The Tax Court held that the $45,000 payment was not deductible alimony. It pointed out that the alimony covered by the first agreement did not add up to $45,000. It pointed out that the former wife waived rights to any other alimony aside from the $6,000 payment. The Tax Court also noted that the $45,000 appeared to be a property settlement. The court explained that under applicable state law, the obligation to pay the $45,000 survived the death of the former spouse, and thus failed to qualify as deductible alimony for federal income tax purposes. The court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that because making the $45,000 payment extinguished any additional obligation on his part to make payments to his former wife the payment was alimony, noting that there is no such test in the Internal Revenue Code or in applicable state law. Finally, the court upheld the imposition of a section 6662 accuracy-related penalty, pointing out, among other things, that the taxpayer did not explain what sources he used to determine his tax liability, that he did not consult a tax professional for advice, and that the fact he is a licensed attorney who at one time held a CPA license “should have alerted him to the fact that alimony is not deductible under section 215(a) unless it satisfies the requirements of section 71(b).
What makes these cases stand out is that in one of them the taxpayer was an attorney-CPA, though it isn’t clear he was a tax professional, and in the other, the taxpayer was advised to obtain advice from a tax professional. I wonder how many state judges ask parties in divorce cases if they have consulted a tax professional. I wonder how many attorneys representing parties in divorce cases advise their clients to do so or ask if they have done so. Not that doing this will eliminate these avoidable outcomes, but perhaps it will reduce the number of these unfortunate outcomes. The fact that both of these cases were handed down on the same day simply magnifies the prevalence of these sorts of situations.