Throughout this fourteen-year period, opposition to the proposal has been vocal. Some comes from people who agree that using liquid fuel taxes to fund these repairs and maintenance is no longer viable, but they seek to raise the necessary revenue through means that have nothing to do with highways, bridges, and tunnels. Some come from people who fear that the proposed road fee would invade their privacy or pose assorted claimed logistical challenges. Some simply want a “let me use it and make someone else pay” approach.
Recently, in a Politico commentary, former Maryland Secretary of Transportation Pete Rahn proposed generating the funding from a commercial activity surcharge. He is among those who favor abolishing liquid fuel taxes, and though he mentions only the federal gasoline tax, it does not appear he wants to preserve state gasoline and diesel taxes.
But Rahn opposes what he calls the “vehicle miles traveled” tax, or VMT. I prefer the word “fee” because the mileage-based road fee is a fee. It relates directly to usage, which is the hallmark of a fee. Rahn’s opposition rests on two concerns. One is the familiar concern about “personal privacy.” The other is what he calls the “cost of collection.”
Rahn’s concern about personal privacy is his claim that as secretary of transportation in Maryland, he observed “the public’s fear of just using anonymous, aggregated cell phone data for planning purposes.” He thinks that “having the government actually be able to identify a person’s type of vehicle and see where and when it is driven will generate opposition that will not be overcome.” He insists that there are “many people who will not get a transponder to pay tolls for this very reason.” Yet people already are giving that information to authorities. In fact, they are giving far more information than a road fee transponder would generate. Cell phones identify where a person is, even when not in a vehicle. Cameras, which are increasing in number hourly, record vehicles and pedestrians. Though Rahn notes the concerns about opening the door to “Big Brother,” the reality is that “Big Brother” already is here and has been for some time. I debunked the privacy concerns of the sort Rahn raised in Is the Mileage-Based Road Fee a Threat to Privacy?, which I concluded with these words: “Existing technology, such as roadside cameras, credit card receipts for fuel purchases, electronic toll systems such as EZPass, and observations by law enforcement authorities, already provide substantial information concerning the location of a vehicle. Similarly, the location of an individual when in public areas is not a secret. The mileage-based road fee does not generate a significant increase in the revelation of vehicle location information, and does nothing to increase the disclosure of individual location information.”
When it comes to the cost of collection, Rahn argues that shifting from a liquid fuel tax that is collected from 600 fuel distributors to collecting from 263 million vehicles presents a significant increase in the cost of collecting the revenue. He claims that projections setting the cost at 15 percent of revenue is too high, and that the estimated percentage is too low. The track record of existing transponder-based tolling systems, such as EZ-PASS, demonstrates that concerns about collection costs are exaggerated. As I wrote in Once Again, Rebutting Arguments Against Mileage-Based Road Fees, in critiquing a report from another opponent of the mileage-based road fee, “The Glostone analysis claims that the mileage-based road fee “would require every vehicle owner to periodically report distance tax and create a costly new bureaucracy that would have to audit these reports,” and that the “added bureaucracy alone could eat up any gains in tax revenue.” The tracking device reports without any need for owner intervention. Digital technology eliminates the need for the roomfuls of eyeshade-wearing human auditors.”
Instead, Rahn wants to implement what he calls a “beneficiary pays” system. He rests this idea on the existence of people benefit from highways, bridges, and tunnels even though they do not drive or ride on those roads. Of course, he is referring to the “national highway system,” but when analyzing the issue in terms of all highways, the number of people who never drive, ride, walk, or bike on a road is a tiny percentage of the population, essentially those who are spending the rest of their lives homebound, imprisoned, or in care facilities. Yet Rahn’s point that even those folks benefit from the nation’s roads because they receive deliveries of products shipped on those roads makes sense. The question is whether it makes enough sense to absolve actual users of any funding responsibility.
Rahn proposes a surcharge on commercial activity “on U.S. streets and highways of approximately 8 percent.” To what would he apply the 8 percent surcharge? It would apply to “what that company charges their customers for transportation services.” Right there is a big problem. Many companies already offer “free shipping” to all or certain customers, but guaranteed these companies are making this up in other ways, such as the prices charged for their products. So perhaps Rahn is thinking about imposing the surcharge on what companies pay to ship goods, but that would require far more collection activity than an EZ-PASS type transponder system would. For someone concerned about the cost of collection for a mileage-based road fee, Rahn doesn’t hesitate to treat the cost of computing and collecting the proposed surcharge as worthy only of a comment about companies that do their own shipping. Not only would trying to do the complex cost accounting of allocating driver salaries, manager salaries, benefits, and other outlays create a new expense, companies would play all sorts of games to minimize what gets included in “cost of shipping.”
Note that Rahn shifts from focusing on the “national highway system” in part of his commentary to “U.S. streets and highways” when describing the proposed surcharge. Though he proposes factoring the cost of rail, vessel, and air shipping out of the amount to which the surcharge would apply, yet another complex cost accounting task that would add to the cost of collection of the surcharge, he doesn’t propose dividing the shipping costs subjected to the surcharge between those applicable to use of federal highways, bridges, and tunnels, and those applicable to use of state and local highways, bridges, and tunnels. Does he propose to allocate some of the surcharge revenue to states and localities? Does he envision abolition of state liquid fuel taxes? Does he contemplate putting all highway, bridge, and tunnel repair and maintenance within the scope of the proposed surcharge?
Rahn claims that the proposed surcharge “more directly aligns the cost of maintenance and improvement with the benefit.” However, that approach ignores the fact that the wear and tear on a highway varies according to the weight of the vehicle, yet the proposed surcharge does not adequately take that difference into account. The mileage-based road fee does, because it is tied directly to the vehicle and adjusted for weight.
The worst part of the proposal is the free ride that it gives to people who would use highways, bridges, and tunnels for personal purposes. Though Rahn might argue that these folks would be paying through the passing on to them of the surcharge imposed on millions of businesses, not everyone makes the same use of product shipping, and that use is disproportionate to the total use people make of highways even taking into account what I call indirect use, that is, the use made by others in order to deliver goods to people.
Rahn’s proposal technically is a “user fee” because it relates to use of roads, highways, and bridges. However, it measures use in a convoluted way, focusing on shipping costs, which are not directly proportional to actual use. And it leaves out use that is unrelated to product shipments. In other words, Rahn has offered, as many do, a theory that cannot hold up to practical reality.