This is long, but it's an issue that deserves more than a soundbite.
The MoneyLaw EssayThanks to a tip from a
posting on Paul Caron's
TaxProf Blog, I took a look at Jeff Harrison's Moneylaw essay on
Counter-Preferential Choice, Shirking, and Moneylaw. Jeff questions whether law faculty are holding up their end of the bargain, perhaps implicit bargain, with what he calls stakeholders: students, donors, and, in taxpayer-financed schools, the public. Jeff takes the position that law schools have an obligation to educate students "that prepares them for the bar exam and, as much as possible, prepares them to provide competent legal services," and gives them the ability to help generate legal reform. Taxpayers, he points out, are entitled to "expect a law school to produce competent attorneys who will be accessible and play a role in improving the overall welfare of the community."
What brought Jeff's essay to the Tax Prof blog was his suggestion that among law school characteristics failing to help law schools meet their obligations are taxpayer-subsidized LL.M. tax programs. He asks if "there is any chance" that LL.M. (Taxation) graduates will do public service work. He asks why is a law school hesitant to charge graduate tax students a tuition reflecting the full cost of their education?
ReactionReaction was swift. Several tax faculty pointed out that graduate tax students often end up in public service positions. The salaries earned while working for Chief Counsel to the IRS, the Department of Justice Tax Division, or a tax court judge do not match, by far, what can be earned in the private sector. Although I agree with the gist of Jeff Harrison's analysis, I part company with him when he assumes that LL.M. (Taxation) graduates give little or nothing back to society. Yet, despite that disagreement with Jeff, I don't think it negates the idea that public subsidy of graduate education ought not be across the board, but tailored to the needs of individual students.
Another criticism of Jeff Harrison's essay was the implicit assumption that the same charge could not be levied against LL.M. programs in other areas of the law. Are lawyers with LL.M. degrees in trial litigation or securities regulation more likely to devote more time to public service efforts? I doubt it. That is why I think taxpayers ought not be subsidizing graduate programs generally as though every student entering such a program deserves or needs tax-subsidized tuition.
Of Course I Have an OpinionMy interest in the discussion was energized by an assertion that the "primary public function of a law school (including tax LL.M. programs) is its research, not its education of students." This opinion was tempered with a disclaimer to the effect that educating students is important and a central goal of law school. Nonetheless, it was pointed out that law school are "expense to run in significant part because professors typically teach only 6 hours a week or less, with half of their time or more set aside for research," thus causing students to "overpay" for their education. Why do students acquiesce to this arrangement? The notion is that students are willing to pay for a degree from a prestigious law school because those degrees have higher value based on the reputation of the law school, in turn allegedly dependent "in large part" on faculty research. The point was then made that law research is a "type of good that has to be subsidized or it will be under-produced by the market." Thus, the argument concludes, law schools receiving tax subsidies are using them more to finance faculty research than to fund law student education.
Something is terribly amiss. Here's an anecdote with a lesson. Years ago, when I was teaching Digital Legal Practice Skills, a course designed to teach law students both the "hows" of technology and its use in law practice, I gave them as an opening problem the design of a spreadsheet to be used for determining if choosing law school rather than a post-college paying career made economic sense. Most of these students had little, if any, business background. It was a classic Jim Maule remedial catch-up course. We no longer teach it because in part I'm teaching other things, no one else wants to teach it, and the need for the course diminished as more entering students understood how to use computers (though not the underlying business and finance principles). Certainly, the students learned about making economic assumptions. Were they forsaking a career opportunity for a degree in history or a degree in computer engineering? What salary opportunities faced them when they graduated law school? What value did they put on a pro bono career?
The interesting outcome was that law school is a poor economic choice (setting aside valuation of satisfaction, prestige, pro bono accomplishments, etc.) unless the student earns a significantly higher salary than the student could earn coming out of college. The degree of difference depended in part on the student's undergraduate major (and in part on the student's other opportunities, such as athletic careers, coaching careers, etc.) There are three years of lost wages to make up, plus the cost of the law school education. One experiment was to jigger the law school tuition amount (using other amounts rather than the then-applicable Villanova tuition). To the extent students are funding legal research by faculty, they are being short-changed. They don't analyze their economic prospects by putting value on law school faculty research. Various studies show that judges and practitioners don't rely as much on law review articles as they do on the commercial advance sheets (perhaps with tax as being a significant exception, ironically).
Compare medical school research. Medical school faculty generate income, both from patient services (some of which are publicly funded) and from outside grants (some of which are publicly funded). Law faculty rarely generate income, and when and if they do, rarely does the school see it.
This is why I think something is amiss. The primary public function of a law school *should* be to educate students so that they can serve the public, whether as public service sector attorneys or as private sector attorneys. The same can be said of any school. The notion that legal research must be subsidized tells us much about the value placed by the market place on it. Indeed, in certain areas the market *does* subsidize research (tax being one), though many law faculty shy away from what is legitimate research because it isn't edited by folks with one or two years of legal education. What has happened is that a good that belongs, if it belongs anywhere, in think tanks, has been put onto the backs of unsuspecting law students, because the cost of educating law students is far less, per capita, than the cost of educating medical students, dental students, engineering students, etc.
If higher education is doing the great job it claims to be doing, there ought be no good reason not to subsidize education through loans with repayment tied to a graduate's economic success, with public funds being used to "reward" graduates who do public service. This is done to some extent, though weakly, through certain tax breaks and loan cancellation programs. Such an approach might help narrow the gap between the high private sector salaries and the low public service sector salaries.
The allegation that the public sector is not getting its money's worth when it funds law (or some other) higher education program is far from new. It's been around for decades, though in recent years its advocates are getting louder and speaking more frequently. The internet creates a wider audience and a deeper communications channel. Institutions of higher education, already summoned, for example, by state legislatures to account for how they operate, surely need to re-define their perceived missions and their operating plans if they intend to survive in a form responsive to the needs of the public.
In other words, public (and private) institutions of higher learning had best figure out how to justify public subsidies on the basis of a return of a public good that the public accepts as a desired public good, rather than on the basis of legal research. Though I agree, to some extent, that legal research has value, I don't think the taxpaying public is or will be convinced by its status as the primary public function of a law school. That may be unfortunate, it may reflect a deep divide between the public and the academy, but it's a very real concern that some current university officials are pondering with deep concern.
Reputation Based on Scholarship: What is It Worth?Perhaps in response to these views, or perhaps in response to an array of opinions, came an observation, noting two essays written by Russell Korobkin of UCLA, who in
Harnessing the Positive Power of Rankings: A Response to Posner and Sunstein, 81 Ind. L.J. 35 (2006), and
In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and Collective Action Problems, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 403 (1998), argues that scholarship is a public good that is produced because schools can enhance their reputation by producing it and because only law schools can produce it. The essay uses this argument to defend the proposition that law schools should be ranked primarily or exclusively by the school's scholarship.
To Korobkin and those who agree with him, I offer the following. There have been more than enough successful lawyers (in terms of income, public interest cases won, beneficial influence on society) who have graduated from law schools lacking high levels of "scholarship reputation" and more than enough disgraceful attorneys (in terms of corruption, disbarment, malpractice, and political scurvy) with degrees from the "scholarship elite" schools to explain why law students (and even some applicants) are beginning to understand that ultimate success as a lawyer has more to do with (a) attending a school where one can learn to think about law in a practice context, (b) having or acquiring good values, and (c) working diligently than it has to do with the reputation or volume of scholarship by a law faculty. Why pay an extra $10,000 a year for a chance to finish in the bottom half of a class at a "scholarship happy" school when there's no guarantee of a successful career, and even a risk that the lack of a practical orientation will make the career far from ideal and possibly even curtailed?
I understand that the reputational thing gives some graduates an "edge" when first entering the marketplace, but the lack of adequate preparation, good values, diligent work habits, and adeptness at dealing with clients in a practical manner soon is unmasked. Likewise, the student from the school whose faculty writings are held in disdain as "too practical" by law school faculties living in abstract worlds may struggle to find the first job but can soon excel once they find a position. It's not all that different from the disappointing play of first-round picks and the successes from the sleepers taken in the latter rounds, or, better yet, the fall-on-their-face performances from graduates of acknowledged football or other factories and the out-of-nowhere accomplishments of people coming out of "never heard of it" schools.
That's not to say scholarship is irrelevant. Worthwhile scholarship, that is, publications that add quality to the practice of law such that judges and lawyers seek it out, generally correlates with the production of graduates who can provide quality to the public sector. The problem is that there is too much abstract stuff that simply has no value outside of the small, closed circle of scholars, or, to quote someone writing a piece that had no connection to reality, "I'm not writing for judges or practitioners. I'm writing for other scholars." I doubt that much value, if any, is being added to the education for which the students are paying in those sorts of circumstances. Truly excellent scholarship should dovetail with truly exceptional, practice-relevant teaching. There's no reason that good teaching should preclude good scholarship. Measuring the value of scholarship by the number of times other scholars cite it is like measuring an athletic team's success by how many times its fans tell each other it's really a good team that got raked by bad calls from the officials. Measuring the value of scholarship by the number of times practitioners find something in it useful to their attempts to assist clients in the public or private sector find justice is far more meaningful.
The sort of scholarship produced by law faculty surely can be produced elsewhere. Imagine a think tank with 10 or 15 scholar types, freed from the distraction of teaching (as some have called it). Why do these places not exist? The market doesn't see a need for it. The fact that scholars with more interest in (and in some instances, having more talent for) writing than teaching, aided by the silliness of rankings that let law school faculties tell each other how wonderful they are, are increasingly taking over law faculties does not mean it is right, and, more importantly, does not mean that the quality of legal education is therefore enhanced. Most importantly, it does not mean that the quality of service and justice rendered to lawyers' clients is getting better.
As more and more law firms find it economically unfeasible to pay high salaries to trainees who know little and understand less (and of which practitioners and their clients are complaining every more vociferously), and as the shock impact of the chasm between practice and academia encountered by graduates increases with its concomitant disillusion, practicing lawyers will move to disconnect bar admission from the monopoly held by accredited law schools. Already, employers are beginning to look at transcripts as they attempt to figure out why some newly hired associates struggle while others do well. So far, all that exists is a small set of anecdotes, but slowly the data will increase to a point that correlations can be identified. It is going to be a battle royal, but it's on the way. Practitioners with specific practice-focused needs will look more closely at transcripts, and favor students with useful education over students with degrees from elite institutions, for they have learned that high LSAT scores alone mean nothing when the client needs immediate assistance. Even the presumption that the brightest and most talented graduates are those coming out of the schools with the higher position in the rankings is eroding, and eroding quickly.
Perhaps if the "what faculties think of each other" component was removed from the rankings, and if components were added that measured malpractice and disbarment among a law school's graduates, that added number of graduates fired, asked to leave, or pressured to depart from firms, and that reflected job performance rankings of graduates, we'd see an entirely different array. But, that won't happen because too many of the influential ranking designers have vested connections. Talking about failure isn't very popular.
But perhaps I am wrong. Perhaps we should measure the quality of medical schools by how many times other medical faculty cite the medical faculty's scholarship, and ignore the infection rate and malpractice experience of that faculty's students. Perhaps we should measure the quality of engineering schools by how many times its faculty's writings are cited, and ignore how many leaking Big Dig tunnels are designed by its graduates. Surely the value of a public good measured by dead patients and crushed vehicles in tunnels is less important that how many times people congratulate each other on a job supposedly well done. Misdirected intelligence isn't a public good.
Maybe There Is Undervalued "Good" Research?These thoughts brought a response from another national tax colleague. It was noted that my point that the market does not value much of what passes as legal research doesn't predispose the outcome, because it is from that very point that advocates of taxpayer subsidization of law faculty scholarship begin their arguments. Just as important, legal research of value to practitioners does not require taxpayer subsidy because practitioners who benefit from it will find ways to pay for it. It's the valuable research for which there is no market that subsidization must finance. An example provided to me is the discovery of "a good way to tax income from offshore tax havens," an outcome that would be "an enormous contribution to a just society."
My question is why that sort of research is not being undertaken by the government agencies that are subsidized by taxpayers to enforce the tax laws. Why should tuition-paying law students bear the cost of law faculty research into ways that the IRS or any other federal agency in any other area of the law can do the jobs their employees are being paid to do? Perhaps it's because those agencies are not paying sufficient salaries to attract the bright minds, many of which are busy trying to find ways to hide even more income in offshore hideaways?
Market Disclosure: What Would It Do?The bottom line is that I do not think faculty research needs to be subsidized. I do not think that education needs to be subsidized, except to the extent the body politic deems it to be a necessity that the market for some reason cannot address. Thus, I favor public funding of education for all children under 18, regardless of their families' economic position and despite the fact that absent a public subsidy many of those children would otherwise be driven by the market away from school and into some other enterprise.
As for higher education, if the market speaks and creates a need, then students will drift to those programs that promise a reward greater than the investment. The market can up the reward (increase salaries) if the market needs to increase the supply of students educated in a program. There is a place for public co-investment to assist those students unable to make the investment. The public subsidy and higher education ought to show confidence in its product by requiring a small (3%?) stake in the graduate's future earnings. If the market wants to subsidize outright grants, it has ways of doing so.
The same can be said for research. The market will fund the research that it needs, either internally (e.g., corporate research), or externally (e.g., university research). The public sector should subsidize such research only if the body politic deems the need to be more than the market determines (e.g., perhaps orphan drugs). What happens to "legal scholarship"? It depends. Some of it has value, and there should be a market for it. In fact, there is a market for some legal scholarship. It's limited and tends to be concentrated in areas of technical specialization (e.g., tax, bankruptcy, environmental). The market does not appear to value other legal research, perhaps because the market perceives it as opinion, politics, and abstract theory. My point is that those producing legal scholarship for which there is no demand other than the producer and the producer's circle ought not leverage their way into having law students pay for it, when law students are ostensibly paying for a legal education.
Perhaps the answer is "Truth in Tuition" legislation? Schools should disclose the portion of tuition that pays for research and scholarship that is not otherwise funded. The computation probably would reflect the number of faculty positions that are filled so that faculty can engage in unmarketable research and scholarship. I wonder what that sort of disclosure would to rankings, after students adjusted their admission decisions?