Once upon a time, some roads were privately owned, and DiStefano gives as an example the Lancaster Turnpike, which is now the state-owned Lancaster Pike that traverses the western Philadelphia suburbs. Yet even while private individuals were building and then charging for use of this turnpike, travelers also had the option of heading west on Conestoga Road, portions of which still exist, without paying tolls. Those in a hurry and with money used the Lancaster Turnpike, and those unwilling or unable to pay used the less convenient Conestoga Road. During World War One, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania purchased the Lancaster Turnpike, took over its maintenance, and abolished the tolls. Today, there are two main differences between Lancaster Pike and Conestoga Road in those areas where both exist. Lancaster Pike has four lanes of travel in most places, whereas Conestoga Road has two lanes. And Lancaster Pike wins the “has more traffic lights” contest by a wide margin. Both roads are toll-free, and both get very congested during peak travel times, and are quite busy throughout most other times.
DiStefano reports that Pennsylvania’s governor, seeing his proposal to use tolls on I-80 to fund road and bridge repairs elsewhere in the state and his proposal to use the proceeds of a Turnpike lease for the same purpose having been rejected, is going to be pressured by a campaign for a return to private toll roads. This campaign, DiStefano tells us, is “a well-funded movement, with support in both parties” and is orchestrated “by building contractors, investors and their professional representatives.” These folks have placed the catchy tag of “Public-Private Partnerships” on their idea.
When the state builds a toll road, it borrows money, pays for the construction, charges tolls, and uses the toll proceeds to maintain the road and to pay off the loans. According to DiStefano, the Public-Private Partnership allows private companies to acquire money by borrowing – “from banks, investors, even federal loan programs” – pay for the construction, charge tolls, and use the toll proceeds to maintain the road and pay off the loans. As best as I can tell, there are two differences between public state toll road construction and private toll road construction. First, the private toll road needs to charge a higher toll in order to make a profit. Second, the private toll road is beyond the control of voters, because voters do not have the opportunity to speak at a ballot box with respect to the private companies the way they do with the state.
DiStefano quotes Frank M. Rapoport, who represents big contractors. He says, “Nobody’s against this,” although I’m guessing that by “this” he means turning over to the private sector the construction of additional highways, or even the construction of additional tolled lanes to existing highways. Rapoport cites, as support for his proposition, a Frank Luntz poll that “found commuters would pay more to drive, if it would cut traffic delays.” That survey proves an unsurprising outcome. Those with the means to do so would pay for access to roads with lower traffic density. But it doesn’t tell me that those roads need to be built with money borrowed by the state that is repaid through state-charged tolls or with money borrowed by private industry that is repaid through private tolls that are higher because the private investors seek a profit that is not an object for a state-operated highway system.
Though Rapoport claims, “Nobody’s against this,” I am, at least until someone demonstrates how the numbers play out. Someone needs to explain to me, and to everyone else for that matter, how a privately constructed and operated toll road is less expensive than one built by the state. In other words, if it is possible for a private company to build a road from point A to point B, or to add express lanes to Highway W, then why can’t the state do the same thing at a lower cost because of the absence of a profit motive? Perhaps the answer is that those who stand to gain by reason of privatizing highways lead the charge to protest “expansion of government” in response to state-built toll roads, but are waiting to jump at the chance to do the same thing themselves in order to squeeze out that profit. Those who cannot afford the higher private tolls would be left to fend for themselves. Perhaps that is the plan. Those who can afford to pay ride on the nice roads, and those who cannot afford to pay are stuck with the public roads that cannot be improved because of objections to “expansion of government.”
The explanations that I provided for my opposition to selling or leasing publicly owned toll roads, shared in Selling Off Government Revenue Streams: Good Idea or Bad?, in Are Citizens About to be Railroaded on Toll Highway Sales?, Turnpike Cash Grab Heats Up, five months later in Selling Government Revenue Streams: A Bad Idea That Won't Go Away, and a year later in Turnpike Lease: Bad Policy and Now a Bad Deal , The Pennsylvania Legislature Gets It Right and Killing the Revenue Idea That Won't Die, are not fully applicable when the road in question is a new road. At least with a new road, a public asset isn’t being sold off to the private sector. But it isn’t clear to me that the analysis of the numbers flips when shifting the question from selling or leasing an existing road to building a new one. Why do something as risky as privatizing highways when there are other options, such as the mileage-based user fees I discussed in Tax Meets Technology on the Road.
Indeed it is risky to transfer highway expansion to the private sector. It’s not a new idea, and one need only look at what happened in California when it permitted private industry to build and charge tolls for express lanes on Route 91 to learn how the ultimate bearer of risk is the taxpayer. More recently, the private enterprise building another California private toll road filed for bankruptcy. In the first instance, the financial mess was absorbed by taxpayers when the regional highway agency had to take over the Route 91 express lane operation. In the second instance, it remains unclear whether Caltrans will need to step in. A major factor in the Route 91 failure was the provisions in the agreement that prohibited the state from building additional lanes on the public portion of the highway. A major factor in the second failure was a huge increase in the tolls.
In How Do Toll Road Lessees Make a Profit?, I pointed out how the profit factor enters into the picture when private industry operates toll roads:
Lee Matchett shared what he calls "another twist" to the proposed arrangement. And indeed a twist it is. He noted that as one tries to determine why the lessee would fork over big bucks for the rights to take over what currently is the equivalent of a break-even enterprise, the answer must be found by "think[ing] through the deal from the other side." He asks:What I said in Raising Revenue Through Tolls Isn't Simple concerning the imposition of tolls on existing toll-free roads applies to the idea of private construction and ownership of new roads or new highway lanes. I predicted what DiStefano indicates is about to happen:What does the lessee have to gain, and what are the lessee's potential pitfalls?. One obvious potential liability for the operator would occur if there was a decrease in revenue caused by, say, a decrease in the vehicles deciding to use the toll road. What could cause this? Well, perhaps if alternative roads were improved, or if some other form of transportation were made available (mass transit, rail, etc.), maybe drivers would opt not to pay the increased tolls.He then directed me to Patrick Bedard's column in the February issue of Car and Driver magazine.It's an important read for drivers, taxpayers, citizens, and voters. Not only are lessees extracting promises from state and local governments to refrain from making improvements to highways offering alternative routes to the leased toll road, they are also compelling the governments to make those alternate routes less attractive by reducing speed limits for no sensible reason (other than to steer vehicles onto the lessee's road) and by adding traffic signals and other restrictions that otherwise have no reason to exist.
Lee's point is important. I've consistently warned that the only way for private enterprise, in the business of making profits, to extract profits from a toll road that presently breaks even is to increase profits, cut services and maintenance, or both. So now the nasty twist to the deal is revealed. Revenue can be increased without raising tolls by coercing drivers to use the toll road. To the free market advocates, I direct this question: Is that how a free market works? If so, it's not a free market. Toll road lessees want to use public resources, namely, the legislature and highway department) to crush any opposition (the alternative roads). It's been happening in the corporate world, to no good end, and now invades the public sector through these "privatization" boondoggles.
Unfortunately, the issue [of tolling existing highways] isn't going to be resolved on the basis of economic analysis, the weighing of public costs and utility, the worth of user fees, or the disadvantages of selling government out to wealthy private interests. Instead, as has happened with so many federal and state legislative decisions during the past several decades, it will come down to politics. More specifically, it will come down to campaign contributions and the granting of favors. And we know, when that is how the game is played, the people with money and assets end up with more, everyone else ends up paying more, and the promised benefits do not materialize as promised. Someday Pennsylvanians and those using Pennsylvania highways are going to rub their eyes, blink, and ask, "How did this happen?" The response will be, "While you were sleeping."Perhaps the eagerness with which advocates of private toll highways in Pennsylvania have adopted a modern phenomenon originating in California can be matched by their eagerness in reading carefully this warning from the story about the bankrupt private toll road project near San Diego: The outcome “may wind up testing the wisdom of public-private partnerships.” With a growing string of failures presented by their predecessors, the private toll road advocates in Pennsylvania have a lot of explaining to do, and the governor and the legislature have a lot of studying to undertake. The last thing Pennsylvania needs is another failed private sector promise.