It is a basic tax law principle that economic windfalls are taxed. That principle applies to a variety of transactions, and as a recent tax court case,
Debough v. Comr., 142 T.C. No. 17 (2014), demonstrates, comes into play when property sold by the taxpayer is reacquired by the taxpayer. In this case, the property in question was the taxpayer’s principal residence and the taxpayer was unable to shelter any of the gain under section 121.
The taxpayer sold his principle residence in 2006 under an installment sale agreement. The taxpayer sold the residence for $1,400,000. Under the sales agreement, the buyers paid $250,000 at the time they entered into the contract, and promised to pay $250,000 on July 12, 2007, along with $25,000 semi-annually until July 11, 2014, when the balance was due.
The taxpayer had purchased the residence for $25,000, and recomputed his adjusted basis after his wife died. Using an adjusted basis of $742,204, he computed gain of $657,796. Before trial, the IRS and taxpayer stipulated that the basis was $779,704.
In 2006, the taxpayer reported gain of $28,178. He did so by excluding $500,000 of gain under section 121, because his wife had died within the past two years, permitting the taxpayer to use the $500,000 limitation rather than the $250,000 limitation. Thus, the taxpayer computed taxable gain of $157,796 ($657,796 minus $500,000), and divided it by $1,400,000 to generate a gross profit ratio of 11.27 percent. Multiplying the $250,000 payment received in 2006 by 11.27 percent generated taxable gain of $28,178. In 2007, the taxpayer received the second $250,000 payment, and again reported $28,178 in taxable gain. In 2008, the taxpayer received only $5,000, and using the 11.27 percent gross profit ratio, reported taxable gain of $564. Thus, the taxpayer reported total taxable gain of $56,920.
The buyers failed to comply with the terms of the contract. The taxpayer reacquired the property in July of 2009, incurring costs of $3,723. The taxpayer treated the reacquisition as full satisfaction of the indebtedness, reporting gain of $97,153. Subsequently, the taxpayer amended the 2009 return and removed the $97,153 gain. Before trial, the IRS and the taxpayer agreed that the taxpayer was obligated to report at least $97,153 of gain. The IRS, however, took the position that the taxpayer ought to have recognized $443,644 of gain. The IRS computed this gain by subtracting the $56,920 reported by the taxpayer from 2006 through 2008 from the $505,000 of cash received by the taxpayer.
Under section 1038(b), a taxpayer who reacquires real property in satisfaction of debt secured by that property is taxed on any money and other property received before the repossession, except to the extent previously reported as income. Section 1038(e) provides that if the taxpayer reacquires property with respect to the sale of which gain was not recognized under section 121, and within one year of the reacquisition the taxpayer resells the property, then section 1038(b) does not apply, and for purposes of section 121, the resale is treated as part of the original sale of the property. The taxpayer and the IRS agreed that section 1038(e) did not apply because the taxpayer did not resell the property within a year.
The taxpayer argued that section 1038(e) does not preclude applying section 121 to the original sale, because “if Congress had intended to completely nullify the section 121 exclusion upon reacquisition of a taxpayer’s principal residence, it would have drafted a provision explicitly so stating.” The IRS argued that the existence of section 1038(e) “confirms that Congress was aware of the interplay between sections 1038 and 121 and drafted section 1038(e) as a limited response thereto; the absence of a ‘more generous provision’ regarding the overlap of sections 1038 and 121 confirms that Congress intended for taxpayers in petitioner’s situation to be treated under the general rules of section 1038.”
The court agreed with the IRS. It held that section 1038 applied to the reacquisition, and that section 121 does not apply to a transaction subject to section 1038 unless it is within section 1038(e). Accordingly, because section 1038(e) did not apply, the taxpayer was subject to section 1038(b) and section 121 did not apply.
The court pointed out that economically, the taxpayer began with property and ended up with property and $505,000. The court cited the
Glenshaw Glass decision in support of its conclusion. That case stands for the proposition that windfalls are gross income. The $505,000 was a windfall, as the taxpayer ended up retaining the property. It was not “unfair,” according to the court, to tax the $505,000. Because $56,920 had already been reported as gain, the other $443,644 of gain was taxable in 2009. Presumably, though the court did not mention it, the $3,723 cost of reacquisition is added to the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the property to be taken into account when the property is resold.
Had the taxpayer resold the property within a year, the taxpayer would have escaped taxation, though how the “unused” portion of the exclusion would have been recovered is unclear. But the taxpayer did not do so, presumably because of adverse market conditions. Perhaps one year is too short of a window in which to resell principal residences under these circumstances. But that one-year period is a creature of the Congress, and cannot be changed by the IRS or by the courts. I don’t expect Congress to change that time period, not only because it isn’t accomplishing much of anything these days in terms of tax law, but also because it isn’t focusing on section 1038 and its interplay with section 121.