There are times when doing something the wrong way is a problem even if the outcome is the desired result. Sometimes, the “no harm, no foul” principle makes sense. Sometimes, even when it make sense, things don’t work out well. In the tax world, though often the IRS and courts look at the substance of a transaction, there are times when form matters more than substance. This notion is illustrated by what happened in
Kirkpatrick v. Comr., T.C. Memo 2018-20.
In Kirkpatrick, the taxpayer and his wife divorced. One of the paragraphs in the consent order entered on September 24, 2012, provided, “ORDERED, that the [taxpayer] shall transfer to [his wife] the sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) directly (and in a non-taxable transaction) into an IRA appropriately titled in [his wife’s] name within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order and that the funds will not be withdraw [sic] until 2013.” The taxpayer and his wife were separated during the entire year in question, and their divorce became final on June 30, 2014.
The taxpayer did not transfer any money into an IRA titled in his wife’s name at any time after the consent order was entered or before the divorce was finalized. The taxpayer made payments directly to his wife throughout 2013. At that time the taxpayer was over 59-1/2 years of age, and paid the money he was ordered to pay to his wife through a series of checks. To make these payments, he withdrew funds from two of his IRAs held at JPMorgan Chase, and transferred that money to his JPMorgan Chase checking account, from which he wrote checks to his wife.
The taxpayer received two Forms 1099-R from JPMorgan Chase for the 2013 taxable year. One showed gross distributions of $116,489.39 from the first account. The other showed gross distributions of $294,665.64 from the second account. Each had a box checked to indicate that the taxable amount was not determined. Petitioner and his wife filed a joint federal income tax return for 2013, on which they reported total IRA distributions of $411,155, with only $116,489 of that amount claimed to be taxable.
The IRS determined, among other things, that the taxpayer had taxable retirement income of $294,665 from JPMorgan Chase. The taxpayer conceded all of that amount but for $140,000, which had been reported as nontaxable on the joint return.
Generally, distributions from an IRA must be included in gross income. An exception exists for transfers incident to divorce. Section 408(d)(6) provides, “The transfer of an individual’s interest in an [IRA] to his spouse or former spouse under a divorce or separation instrument described in [section 71(b)(2)(A)] is not to be considered a taxable transfer made by such individual notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, and such interest at the time of the transfer is to be treated as an [IRA] of such spouse, and not of such individual.”
The taxpayer made three arguments in support of his position that the IRA withdrawals fell within the exception. First, he argued that the consent order is a written instrument incident to a divorce within the meaning of section 71(b)(2)(A). Second, he argued that nothing in section 408 or its regulations offers any specific guidance on the timing of a transfer for it to qualify under the section 408(d)(6) exception, and thus it is logical to assume that any transfer is nontaxable so long as it occurs in a timeframe beginning with the issuance of a written instrument, such as the consent order, and through a judgment of absolute divorce, as happened in this instance. Third, the taxpayer argued that the fact the funds passed through his checking account on the way from him to his spouse’s IRA should have no bearing on the taxability of the exchange because the funds were moved within the allowable time limit for this type of transaction.
The IRS also made three arguments in support of its position that the IRA withdrawals were taxable. First, it argued that the taxpayer did not transfer an interest in his IRAs to his wife, because no IRA was opened in her name, nor were any funds transferred from the taxpayer’s IRAs to an IRA owned by his wife. Second, though conceding that the consent order was a written instrument incident to a divorce, the IRS argued that the taxpayer did not comply with its terms because he did not make the required transfer within 14 days, and thus any transfer that was made was not made pursuant to the order. Third, the IRS argued that any argument by the taxpayer that state divorce law should be determinative as to the IRA distributions’ taxability is erroneous, because state-specific requirements for obtaining a divorce do not preempt or override the Internal Revenue Code.
The taxpayer rebutted the IRS arguments, claiming that there was a transfer of his interest in his IRAs, that they were made under a divorce instrument, and that he complied with all of the conditions in the consent order. He explained that his wife failed to establish an IRA to receive the transferred funds, but that he is not responsible for that failure. He also claimed that state divorce law with respect to taxability from time to time conflict with the IRS position and that to ignore the state court position would put him in contempt of court.
The Tax Court first disposed of $40,000 of the amount in dispute, noting that it had nothing to do with the ordered transfer of an IRA interest. Instead, it related to another paragraph in the consent order requiring the taxpayer to pay attorney fees and litigation costs. The IRA withdrawals made for that purpose would not fall within the exception, and because the taxpayer did not address this amount, the Tax Court considered the taxpayer to have conceded this amount, leaving in dispute the $100,000 IRA transfer.
The Tax Court next disposed of the taxpayer’s argument that the conflict between the state court’s reference to “nontaxable manner” and the IRS position. It pointed out that if a conflict existed, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution would resolve the matter in favor of the IRS position. It also pointed out that there was no conflict, because the state court was not holding that any transfer would be nontaxable but that the taxpayer was required to make the transfer in a manner that would cause it to be nontaxable under federal income tax law, something that the taxpayer failed to do.
The Tax Court turned to the applicability of the section 408(d)(6) exception. Relying on prior cases, it explained that there are only two ways to fall within the exception. One is to change the name on the IRA account. The other is to have the trustee of the taxpayer’s IRA transfer funds to the trustee of the wife’s IRA. The taxpayer did not do either of these things. Instead, the taxpayer did what the Tax Court had previously concluded did not fall within the exception, namely, he took a distribution from his IRA and then transferred that cash to his wife.
The Tax court noted that, “Ultimately, [the taxpayer’s] argument rests on the idea that the alleged substance of what occurred should govern and not its strict form.” The court declined to do so, even if the money had been placed by the taxpayer’s wife in an IRA, something that had not been proven, because, as the Court of Appeals to which the case is appealable stated, “’Form’ is ‘substance’ when it comes to law. The words of law (its form) determine content (its substance).” Though that notion has been honored in the breach in some instances, in this case the Tax Court pointed out that section 408(d)(6) refers to an “interest in an individual retirement account” and not “assets from an individual retirement account” or “interest in or assets from an individual retirement account.” The Tax Court summed it up in two words: “Form matters.” And thus the $100,000 must be included in the taxpayer’s gross income.
The taxpayer’s failure to cause his actions to mesh with the required form cost the taxpayer tens of thousands of dollars. It is not difficult to ask the trustee of an IRA to transfer a particular amount of money or other assets into an IRA established in the name of the transferee. In some ways, it would be easier to do that than to ask for the distribution, and then write and deliver one or more checks.
People who insist that proper form be followed often are tagged as picky, demanding, obsessive, or worse. Yet, in so many fields, form matters. Proper form matters in sports, in music, in grammar, in posture, in etiquette, and in many other situations. Form matters.