When people ask me if I am retired, I tell them, “Not really.” Yes, I’m retired, because I stepped down from my full-time tenure-track position on the law faculty. But I continue to teach, as a part-time employee, and I hold another small part-time position, as an employee, the proceeds of which I donate back to the organization; I’d rather be a volunteer but that’s a tale for another day. So it was interesting to me to encounter a recent Tax Court decision,
Voight v. Martin, T.C. Summ. Op. 2018-25.
The taxpayer has worked for Tulane University from February 8, 1985, to June 7, 1991. When Tulane encountered financial difficulties, it eliminated the taxpayer’s job. As part of the arrangement, the taxpayer received a severance package that included an extended tuition waiver for himself and his dependents. The separation notice showed the petitioner’s reason for leaving as “Elimination of Position,” and neither the box “Not Physically Able to Work” nor the box “Retirement, Pension” were checked. Because the taxpayer had six years of service, the taxpayer was granted six annual tuition waivers. After leaving Tulane, the taxpayer worked at Cornell and at America Online before becoming self-employed.
In the fall of 2012, the taxpayer’s daughter entered Tulane, and attended through the spring semester of 2015. The taxpayer filed applications to apply the tuition waivers for the spring and fall semesters of 2013. On the application, he identified his eligibility for the waiver as “Laid Off-Benefits Package.” Tulane granted a waiver of $21,575 on August 6, 2013. In 2014 Tulane sent a Form W-2 to the taxpayer, showing wages of $21,575, social security tax withheld of $1,338, and Medicare tax withheld of $313. Tulane also billed the taxpayer $1,650 for “2013 Waiver FICA Taxes.” The taxpayer did not report the $21,575 on the joint income tax return he filed with his spouse.
At some point before April 4, 2016, the taxpayer sent an email to Tulane asking about the Form W-2. On that date, a Tulane payroll department official replied, explaining, “[b]ecause you were not an employee with the University, and you received the Tuition Waiver Benefit, the waiver is considered income to you”. On the next day, the taxpayer responded and asked, “Please send me something that shows my dates of employment when I was actually working for Tulane as a staff member.” On May 16, 2016, the payroll official replied, “Per your request; your dates of employment were 02/08/85-06/07/91.”
The IRS issued a notice of deficiency, and among the adjustments was a determination that the taxpayer had failed to report the $21,575 tuition waiver as income for 2013. The taxpayer and his spouse timely filed a petition in which they made two assertions. First, the tuition waiver benefit is not taxable. Second, the IRS determined that a similar tuition waiver benefit for 2012 was not taxable.
At trial, the taxpayer argued that including the tuition waiver benefit as income in 2013 would be improper because the tuition waiver benefit represents “money that I earned 20 years ago,” apparently claiming that the benefit should have been taxed in 1991. The Tax Court determined that the benefit would be included in income in the year in which it was actually or constructively received, that it was actually received in 2013, and was not constructively received in 1991 because in that year neither the taxpayer nor his dependents had satisfied Tulane’s admissions standards and enrolled in the university. Therefore, unless an exclusion applied, the year in which the income would be included was 2013.
The taxpayer argued that the section 117 exclusion for scholarships and qualified tuition reductions applied to the waiver. The Tax Court explained that under section 117(d)(2), in order for the waiver to be a qualified tuition reduction, it must be provided to an employee of a qualified education institution for the education, below a graduate level, at a qualified education institution of either the employee or someone treated as an employee under section 132(h). Persons treated as employees under section 132(h) are former employees who separated from service “by reason of retirement or disability” and the dependents of employees, spouses and surviving spouses, and others not applicable to the taxpayer’s situation. Because the parties agreed that the taxpayer’s daughter was his dependent in 2013, that Tulane is a qualified education institution, and that the taxpayer did not end employment with Tulane by reason of disability, the issue was whether the taxpayer was either a current employee of Tulane in 2013 or was treated as an employee because he had separated from service by reason of retirement under section 132(h).
The taxpayer argued that he was an employee because he received a Form W-2, because the references on that form to “employer” and “employee” suggested to the taxpayer that sometime in 2013 “Tulane University thought I worked there.” The Tax Court noted that the issuance of a Form W-2 does not create an employment relationship, and that a Form W-2 may be required even when there is no longer an employment relationship, such as when social security and Medicare taxes are imposed on wages as defined in section 3121, which can include payments for employment “even though at the time paid the relationship of employer and employee no longer exists.” Thus, whether the taxpayer was an employee in 2013 is a factual question, resolved under common law rules. Aside from the Form W-2, the taxpayer did not present any evidence of an employment relationship. The taxpayer conceded he did not work for Tulane after 1991, and Tulane’s records confirm that he had not been an employee since 1991.
The taxpayer next argued that because the term “retired” in section 132(h) is not defined, being “laid off” as he was constituted early retirement. The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer’s employment with Tulane had not terminated because of retirement. Because there is no definition in the Code of the term “by reason of retirement,” the court applied the principles that the plain language of a statute must be enforced, and that words must be construed so that they are not superfluous or insignificant. Turning to Black’s Law Dictionary, the court adopted the definition of “retirement” as the “[t]ermination of one’s own employment or career, esp. upon reaching a certain age or for health reasons; retirement may be voluntary or involuntary.” The court explained that this definition’s specific mention of termination of a career and special focus upon age or health as reasons for termination conforms with the ordinary meaning of the term “retirement” to refer to a time after an individual stops working. Thus, to give meaning to the inclusion of the term “retirement” requires that retirement be recognized as different from other methods by which an employee may separate from service, including being laid off, because otherwise the term “retirement” as used in section 132(h) would be is rendered superfluous or insignificant. The court also noted that this definition of retirement was consistent with the definition applied by the Supreme Court in the context of bankruptcy.
The Tax Court explained that the taxpayer had not retired because Tulane identified the reason for the termination of employment to be “Elimination of Position” even though retirement was a preprinted option, because the taxpayer’s severance package included assistance in finding further employment, and because the taxpayer testified that he was laid off because Tulane was having “money troubles.” Thus, the termination of the taxpayer’s employment was not contingent on age, years of service, or health considerations. Additional proof that the taxpayer was not retired was found by the court in the taxpayer’s continuing to work for a variety of other employers and for himself after he was laid off by Tulane.
So in order to be retired, at least for purposes of section 132(h) and the provisions that reference it, a person needs to leave employment on account of age, years of service, or health, without thereafter undertaking self-employment or employment with the same or a different employer. By that definition, I am not retired. Perhaps someday I will be. Check back later.