The debate over the best way to fix the nation’s crumbling architecture is heating up. Though some engineers and some public policy and tax policy commentators have been warning people for years and offering suggestions, only now is the general public beginning to pay more attention. People are noticing that the public-private partnership model used in some instances with little fanfare isn’t generating the benefits advertised.
Readers of this blog know that I am no fan of privatization, because privatization does not work, and these private enterprises have a goal, maximization of the bottom line at all costs, that is inconsistent with the goal of maintaining and improving the public welfare. Why privatization does not work is something I discussed in
Are Private Tolls More Efficient Than Public Tolls?,
When Privatization Fails: Yet Another Example,
How Privatization Works: It Fails the Taxpayers and Benefits the Private Sector,
Privatization is Not the Answer to Toll Bridge Problems,
When Potholes Meet Privatization, and
Will Private Ownership of Public Necessities Work? As I noted in
So Guess Who Pays for the Senate’s Tax Cuts for Corporations and Wealthy Americans?, the anti-tax/privatization movement is part of a “plan to eliminate or privatize Medicare, Social Security, national defense, and everything else so that eventually the oligarchy owns everything.”
As for the highway, bridge, and tunnel funding challenge, there is a twenty-first century solution. I have explained, defended, and advocated for the mileage-based road fees for many years, in posts such as
Tax Meets Technology on the Road,
Mileage-Based Road Fees, Again,
Mileage-Based Road Fees, Yet Again,
Change, Tax, Mileage-Based Road Fees, and Secrecy,
Pennsylvania State Gasoline Tax Increase: The Last Hurrah?,
Making Progress with Mileage-Based Road Fees,
Mileage-Based Road Fees Gain More Traction,
Looking More Closely at Mileage-Based Road Fees,
The Mileage-Based Road Fee Lives On,
Is the Mileage-Based Road Fee So Terrible?,
Defending the Mileage-Based Road Fee,
Liquid Fuels Tax Increases on the Table,
Searching For What Already Has Been Found, Tax Style,
Highways Are Not Free,
Mileage-Based Road Fees: Privatization and Privacy,
Is the Mileage-Based Road Fee a Threat to Privacy?,
So Who Should Pay for Roads?,
Between Theory and Reality is the (Tax) Test,
Mileage-Based Road Fee Inching Ahead,
Rebutting Arguments Against Mileage-Based Road Fees,
On the Mileage-Based Road Fee Highway: Young at (Tax) Heart?,
To Test The Mileage-Based Road Fee, There Needs to Be a Test,
What Sort of Tax or Fee Will Hawaii Use to Fix Its Highways?,
And Now It’s California Facing the Road Funding Tax Issues,
If Users Don’t Pay, Who Should?,
Taking Responsibility for Funding Highways,
Should Tax Increases Reflect Populist Sentiment?,
When It Comes to the Mileage-Based Road Fee, Try It, You’ll Like It,
Mileage-Based Road Fees: A Positive Trend?,
Understanding the Mileage-Based Road Fee,
Tax Opposition: A Costly Road to Follow,
Progress on the Mileage-Based Road Fee Front?, and
Mileage-Based Road Fee Enters Illinois Gubernatorial Campaign. When a reader asked how my support for the mileage-based road fee fit with my preference for a progressive income tax, I answered that question in
Is a User-Fee-Based System Incompatible With Progressive Income Taxation?.
Recently, a reader directed me to
a proposal for a different way to fund infrastructure repair and maintenance. The suggestion is to fund an “infrastructure bank” by requiring “every American public company” to issue “1 percent of its equity in the form of new stock” to an infrastructure bank, and to put this requirement in place for a three-year period. The proposal would rise roughly $1 trillion. The justification rests on a reaction to the newly opened Mario Cuomo Bridge and the benefits it brings to “high-growth regional companies” because it “supports the efficient movement of supplies and finished products, makes for a happier commute for our employees and can make a difference in recruiting key talent.” The money put into the bank would be dished out as grants or loans “to support worthy infrastructure projects.”
The proposal is worth discussing, because careful analysis raises a variety of questions. I doubt that I have identified all of the questions.
First, as the proposal suggests, funding infrastructure needs through increases in personal or corporate income taxes or through wealth taxes is unlikely to happen. Yet the proposal recognizes that “some companies and their shareholders will surely grumble.” I daresay the question is whether the “some” would actually be “many” or “nearly all.” The proposal admits that it “would put the burden onto wealthy Americans and foreigners.” Is it realistic to think that most of them would not grumble?
Second, the proposal notes that the required equity contributions “would hardly be a burden.” Is that actually the case? Do we know that every public company can afford to make the contributions without hurting its business? The proposal notes that the one-percent-of-equity-contribution requirement is less than the “typical daily fluctuation in many companies’ stock prices,” but is this true for all companies? Aren’t variations in stock prices more of an issue for shareholders? The proposal notes that last year, companies paid $800 billion to buy back their own stock. But is this something that will happen every year, or is it a one-time event reflecting the surge of tax break dollars flowing into corporate treasuries? Is it possible that this realization is yet another example of why it would have been better to invest in infrastructure rather than plowing money into tax breaks, considering that “[t]he White House Council of Economic Advisers estimates that gross domestic product would increase up to $13 billion a year for every $100 billion in infrastructure investment”?
Third, considering that the “infrastructure investment gap over the next two decades” is roughly $5 trillion, the proposal makes too small of a dent in the funding requirement. Meeting a $5 trillion need through the equity contribution proposal would require not three years, but 15 years, of contributions. Whatever grumbling a three-year requirement would generate, a 15-year requirement would be orders of magnitude more vociferous.
Fourth, if money from the infrastructure bank were paid out as loans, who would be responsible for repayment? Would state and local governments be the borrowers? If so, would they not need to increase or impose tolls on transportation infrastructure or raise taxes with respect to all infrastructure in order to repay? Or is the plan to make loans to private sector enterprises, thus bringing privatization of public resources back into the picture through a different pathway? If money is distributed as loans, what happens when the loans are repaid? If recycled into more infrastructure projects, what happens when, as the proposal puts it, “its infrastructure mission is accomplished” and it “might even liquidate itself.” Does the money go back to the corporations? What if they are no longer in existence?
Fifth, who decides if an infrastructure project is “worthy” and how is that determination made? To what extent will politics be a factor? The proposal wants the infrastructure bank to be “apolitical.” Is that realistic? If not, to what extent will campaign contributions by construction companies and related enterprises looking for infrastructure repair work be a factor? Will rural or urban projects get a disproportionate amount of the grants or loans? Though the proposal claims that “Although detailed mechanisms for issuing the stock and managing the portfolio would need to be defined, this plan should be more straightforward than an income tax,” isn’t it quite possible that it would be just as complicated as income taxes?
Sixth, why limit the proposal to American companies? Do not foreign corporations doing business in this country benefit from the nation’s infrastructure? Though the proposal notes that “84 percent of all stock held by Americans belongs to the wealthiest 10 percent of households, and foreign investors account for 35 percent of investment in American stocks,” does that suggest domestic shareholders of foreign corporations doing business in this country would also share in the burden? Conversely, if there are companies and shareholders who do not benefit from infrastructure repairs and maintenance, why put the burden on them?
Seventh, why just corporations? Isn’t there a significant amount of equity in limited liability companies, partnerships, hedge funds, and private equity funds? Why should they be excluded from the funding party?
The more I thought about the idea, the more I began to consider what the proposal would be, in substance, if it took the form of mandatory contributions, loans repaid, probably with interest as the proposal notes, additional loans made and repaid, and the infrastructure bank liquidated by returning the contributions, with or without interest, to the corporations (and other entities). Is this not the equivalent of floating bonds to fund infrastructure repair and maintenance, but buttressed by what amounts to compelled purchase of those bonds by corporations (and other entities)? Why compel the purchase? What would happen if infrastructure bonds were floated, with the security not being tax revenues, but pledges from corporations (and other entities) in the event that the bonds were not repaid through fees imposed for the use of the new or repaired infrastructure? If different alternatives are going to be put on the table, perhaps the pledged bond idea also should be added to the list.