My commentary on the failure of Congress to deal with partnership basis adjustments by making them mandatory rather than adding two more layers of complexity to the existing morass generated a lively discussion among tax law professors. They raised some concerns worth consideration, as they shed some light on the sorry state into which American tax law has sunk. Note my questions that are in bold.
One participant suggested that because basis adjustments can be burdensome, it is a "nice compromise" to limit mandatory adjustments to instance where failure to make the adjustment provides an opportunity to duplicate or assign losses, pointing out that "theory is oftentimes sacrificed for good administrative reasons."
I replied that the existence of section 732(d) (giving the partner the right to elect to make adjustments even if the partnership did not do so, although only with respect to distributions)made partnership avoidance of its own election worthless, because section 732(d) requires the partnership to go back in time to when it could have made its own election and then redo computations from that point up until the time that the partner makes his or her 732(d0 election. Thus, it is more burdensome to wait for section 732(d), and this is what causes most partnerships formed with professional advice to have agreements specifying that section 754 will be elected. Those not electing fall into two groups, those unaware that they're not really saving themselves from burden, and those who want to play the system. Thus, I argue, a mandatory election is not only theoretically correct, it would simplify the administration of subchapter K and reduce the burden of compliance.
I was then asked how does the 732(d) election allow a partner to "force" the partnership to do what it sought to avoid. It was argued that 732(d) puts the burden on the individual partner, not the partnership. Presumably, the argument continues, the buying partner would have calculated the basis adjustment before making the purchase, as part of evaluating the deal.
I replied as follows: The section 732(d) election requires the same computation as would be made under section 743(b). Partnership law and partnership agreements give the partners access rights to partnership books and records. Thus, the partnership, at the very least, the partnership is burdened by having to permit that access. In addition, the application of the adjustments requires the partnership to provide the information that would have been different had the adjustments been in effect. Depreciation is one significant example of an adjustment that has this spillover effect. As I noted, it is the "threat" of the section 732(d) election that contributes heavily to the decision by most partnerships (and almost all counselled by a tax advisor) to put into the agreement a requirement that section 754 be elected the first taxable year in which an event occurs that makes the election available. The "threat" simply is the unilateral nature of section 732(d) and the obligation of the partnership to generate the information that it, the partnership,
must report on its return and on the Schedules K-1.
Continuing, I explained: If the buying partner has the opportunity to access the information before the deal settles, it is more likely that the buying partner will seek partnership agreement to make the section 754 election as a condition of the deal going through. If the transfer is by reason of death, there is no examination by the estate prior to the transaction, so the estate isn't in the situation you describe. That may be the reason that the proposed legislation making the election mandatory had an "out" for death transfers (while, at the same time, repealing 732(d) for all partners, including estates that opted out of an otherwise mandatory section 743(b)). As a practical matter, one way or another most partnerships will end up having to do the computations.
(Whether a partnership can charge to the partner electing 732(d) the cost of doing the computations is an interesting question, but I've never seen it done.).
In response, it was suggested that there was no point in lobbying for the exceptions that apply to investment and securitization partnerships. These partnerships rarely make the election, so if section 732(d) was forcing them to do the computations, what's the benefit of the exception and why lobby for it?
I replied: Investment and securitization partnerships benefit from avoiding the election when there are losses. So they don't want the mandatory rule. These partnerships are a small portion of total partnerships. Rather than asking for an exception to an overall mandatory rule, they convinced Congress to create a limited mandatory rule and then obtained exceptions to it, giving the impression that they weren't getting as big a break as it would otherwise appear. In other words, "it's a break from a little thing" isn't quite as offensive to those who want equitable taxation as "it's a break to a rule that applies in all other instances."
I suspect that these partnerships require investors to waive their section 732(d) rights, or arrange transactions so that there are no property distributions that would trigger section 732(d). Is that so?
Another reader jumped in and agreed that it would be simpler and cleaner to make the adjustments mandatory. He expressed doubt about the impact of section 732(d). He also informed me that the proposed optins regulations would have made section 754 elections, and thus the adjustments, mandatory. He asked if the legislation will cause the IRS to rethink the proposed regulations and guessed not. My question, raised here for the first time, is this:
Can the IRS make mandatory something that the Congress permits taxpayers to choose or ignore?
Another participant suggested that the basis adjustments were not desired by those who acquire partnership interests through discount purchases, such as those that arise when there are aggressive valuation discounts in family partnerships. I suppose, though, that the problems for these partnerships will start with the valuation egg and not the basis adjustment chicken. And the previous reader questioned if such a purchaser should even have the option of ignoring the adjustments.
The first respondent then explained that he would prefer the mandatory adjustment, but didn't agree with my position that the legislative solution is inappropriate. The complexity of the exceptions are a problem, he proposes, for those who qualify for the exception, and since they lobbied for it, it's their burden. He did, however, note that it makes the Code heavier for those who carry it around. Responding to another participant's comment, he noted that clean and simple can be just as bad as messy and complex. He then pointed out an issue not raised in
my blog commentary, namely, that the selection of $250,000 without any finding connecting that amount to the scope of the administrative burden creates a distortion, perpetuates complexity, and appears to be the product of lobbying. He's right. I did not focus on that question, and he's right, it does have the flaws he points out. What is so bad about $251,000 that isn't so bad about $249,000? To me, of course, it's further "proof" that a clean and simple mandatory adjustment rule would provide far fewer opportunities for distortion, complexity, and favoritism.
I pointed out that the computations were more of a burden in the past, before computer software made the computations much less of a burden (other than the information retrieval issue). I know that the big accounting firms have proprietary software, so, again, it's the unadvised tiny partnerships that get into the mess of computation burden just as they might fail to make the election because of the lack of guidance.
Another professor asked how many "unadvised tiny partnerships" or even "minimally advised small partnerships" or "basically advised medium-sized partnerships" actually deal with this or any of the other complex stuff in subchapter K? 754, 734(b), 743(b), or, indeed, 751 or 755. He then posed this marvelous challenge: "If you have an idea what percentage of your law school's graduates can explain how section 751 works, take a guess as to how the percentages run in accounting programs, and then figure out who is likely to advise any but the largest partnerships and partners, my guess is that an overwhelming majority of sales of partnership interests are recorded as pure capital transactions, with no adjustments to partnership bases. (I'm not even asking whether section 752 was applied correctly to get the right amount of gain or loss.) It will be interesting to see how a mandatory section 754 election is applied in practice." He noted that figuring out compliance rates is challenging, but that anecdote suggests it is not high. I agree, and I've had the same anecdotal experience. As he pointed out, it's not bad faith but inability to understand very complicated rules that affect many people because many people are in partnerships. Almost all multimember LLCs, recall, are partnerships for this purpose.
One of the previous participants noted he had also had the same anecdotal experience. He then related his own experiences with a partnership that just didn't get the allocations right.
I then shared one of my favorite "teaching Partnership Taxation" stories that illustrates how out-of-control the tax system has become. Tonight I taught section 751. About seven years ago, as we worked through section 751 (in the LL.M. (Taxation) Partnership Tax course), a woman raised her hand and asked if I was sure that there was ordinary income. I replied I was as sure as ever, why was she asking? She replied that she had been doing partnership interest sales in her firm for 5 or 6 years (I cannot remember whether it was 5 or 6) and that no one had EVER done section 751. The following week she returned to tell me her partners were so interested that several were going to enroll in the program (I don't know if they did). I've had similar experiences at CLEs. I noted that even on the ABA-TAX list there is a lot of misinterpretation and lack of knowledge about partnership taxation, and sometimes even resistance to the rules when they get explained (usually by yours truly) as in "that just can't be because I've never done it that way." OK. :-) People who can rumble through subchapter K are in demand.
To which yet another tax law professor said, "And that's just 751(a). With 751(b), it's probably worse." Oh, how true. To which someone else replied that the consensus among many tax practitioners is that absolutely no one pays attention to sec. 751(b) even if they know about it. To me, that is scary, and very indicative of a tax system beginning to melt down. I inquired if the situation as "sort of like speed limits? Until there is an accident......." and pointed out that "The difference is that whereas most highway patrol officers understand speed limits there are very few IRS auditors and agents who understand subchapter K."
One of the participants noted he, too, had always "wondered when the tax system would implode from all of the complexity." Rumors that subchapter K compliance is a mirage seem to be true for section 751(b) as well. He commented "If this keeps up, the only persons who will care about understanding subchapter K will be the professors who have to teach it!" I doubt it would be the first time something taught in a law school found no home in the practice world. The difference, though, is that subchapter K is not the creation of the academic world but a law enacted and imposed by the Congress. Yet it could become as respected as speed limit laws (which I've never seen or heard discussed or analyzed in law school, even though I've heard stories of engineers representing themselves and getting out of tickets by proving the worthlessness of certain radar and other speed measurement devices, causing me to think that every lawyer should have at least one engineer friend).
One of the participants then suggested that other than sales of interests, most partnerships comply with subchapter K without really trying to do so. He noted that partnerships that don't set up special allocations and keep everything proportional don't have compliance problems. He asked why partners would make disproportionate distributions (which is what triggers 751(b)). The complexity, he noted, is directed toward tax shelter partnerships. He asserted that subchapter K is "pretty recent" and that this suggests things worked well for some period of time without it.
Yet another participant noted that none of us has actual data, but that proportionate distributions on liquidation are rare. Another person made the same point.
Where IS the data on subchapter K compliance? Anyone know?
I then contributed this analysis of why all partnerships get caught up in the complexity: I think it's correct that small partnerships in which each partner contributes cash, has an equal or proportionate interest, takes draws and distributions in accordance with those interests, etc, doesn't have much of a problem complying with subchapter K. I've long proposed two subchapter Ks... one for tax shelter partnerships (as already defined) and one for all others.
Yet, even the small partnership has these issues, at least one of which is likely to be the case:
1. Contribution of property (704(c))
2. Liabilities with guarantees or other shifting (752)
3. Death of a partner or sale in the middle of a year (706(d))
4. Liquidation of an interest (need to draft for and comply with 736)
5. Close down when not all assets can be distributed proportionately, so one partner takes more of the inventory/receivables and less of other stuff, and other partners take less of the inventory/receivables (sec 751(b)) Disproportionate distributions are common, because it is rare (and very difficult) to slice up the assets 10% or 25% each. Only if they do a careful trade-off within the inventory/receivables category (remembering that deprn recapture but not the rest of the depreciable property is a receivable) can they avoid a disproportionate distribution. (disproportionate does not mean the 70% partner getting other than 70% of the assets, it means getting other than 70% of each asset).
I added: Subchapter K has been around for 54 years. The tax law, before that, was around for 41 years. And for the last 15 years of that 41 years there were all sorts of problems, as evidenced by cases we no longer read, cite, or teach (with Culbertson being one of the few that survived in terms of relevance to post 1954 partnership taxation). Much of the tax law distorts what would happen in a no-tax world. True for partnerships. True for corporations, trusts, etc etc. True even for the entities that would not even exist but for a tax world (IRAs, SEPs, 403(b) plans, etc etc)
If you've made it this far, I hope you've acquired an appreciation for how the tax law becomes complex, and for how that complexity triggers noncompliance. Applied beyond this one instance where Congress, in my mind, forfeited its opportunity to simpify the Code, one wonders whether a simplified tax law would increase compliance so that the hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes not paid by those who fail to comply, wilfully or accidentally, would find their way into the Treasury, permitting the reduction of budget deficits and another round of tax cuts. After all, the accumulated unpaid taxes, which represent burdens borne by those totally or substantially complying with the tax law and by the creditors financing the deficit, also represent benefits taken against public will by those who fail to comply. And at this point, though much is uncollectible, they total at least 2 trillion when interest is taken into account. I guess that's why Congress keeps cutting the IRS budget and complaining about things the IRS does to collect taxes.
Many thanks to those who contributed to the discussion, raised good points, asked good questions, supplied me with new information, and shared their views and experiences. I didn't attach names to the descriptions because I don't have the right to do that to anyone, but I think I can identify them without tagging anyone with any specific comment so that everyone can recognize this particular group (of many) who contribute to my intellectual sanity: Jack Bogdanski of Lewis and Clark Law School, Mark Cochran of St. Mary's University, Alan Gunn of Notre Dame Law School, Darryll Jones of the University of Pittsburgh Elliott Manning of the University of Miami, Marty McMahon of the University of Florida College of Law, Walter Schwidetzky of the University of Baltimore, and David Shakow of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.