The debate between those who want to tax capital gains and dividends as all other income is taxed and those who want to bless the recipients of capital gains and dividends with special low tax rates has been underway since the first proposal to tax capital gains at low rates was presented and enacted. Arguments in favor of the special provision and against the special provision have been advanced by hundreds of commentators, and as many as several dozen arguments have been lined up on both sides of the debate. Almost nine years ago, in Capital Gains, Dividends, and Taxes, I dissected these arguments and proposed a solution that remains unpursued.
The argument presented most often and most vehemently by the advocates of special low tax rates for capital gains and dividends is that reducing taxes on this type of income is good for the economy. For example, in a 2011 interview, Grover Norquist claimed, “Every time we've cut the capital gains tax, the economy has grown. Whenever we raise the capital gains tax, it's been damaged. It's one of those taxes that most clearly damages economic growth and jobs.”
But how good for the economy, and by extension, the American people, is the special treatment for capital gains and dividends? What’s surprising is not just the answer, but the identity of the person providing it.
An extensive study released about a month ago concludes that the central cause of the explosion in income inequality during the past 15 years is capital gains and dividends. To quote the abstract:
This paper examines changes in after-tax income inequality among tax filers between 1991 and 2006. In particular, how changes in wages, capital income, and tax policy contribute to changes in income inequality is investigated. To examine the role of these three possible contributors to the increase in income inequality, the Gini coefficient is decomposed by income source using the method developed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). The Gini coefficient of after-tax income increased by 15 percent (0.071 points) between 1991 and 2006. By far, the largest contributor to this increase was changes in income from capital gains and dividends. Changes in wages had an equalizing effect over this period as did changes in taxes. Most of the equalizing effect of taxes took place after the 1993 tax hike; most of the equalizing effect, however, was reversed after the 2001 and 2003 Bush-era tax cuts. Similar results are obtained with other inequality measures.In other words, by lowering tax rates on the type of income that causes income inequality, the extent of income inequality is exacerbated. In some respects, this is not news, as it was predicted in a study on which I commented in Blowing Away Some of the Capital Gains Smoke.
The study was conducted by Thomas Hungerford. As explained in this report, it was conducted by an economist whose “data is widely cited on both sides [of the tax policy and public expenditure debate]; he’s an impeccably objective analyst.” This is information developed from deep intellectual analysis, not the limbic system outbursts that fuel most of the political sound bites drowning out sapiens sapiens thinking.
Advocates of special low tax rates for capital gains have one sensible argument, an argument that is inapplicable to dividends. To the extent that the gain reflects increases in value of property that mirror inflation, taxing the gain would be taxing non-real income. The solution, of course, is to index adjusted basis for inflation. There are dozens of places in the tax law where amounts are indexed for inflation. It’s not a new concept, it’s something easily done, and it solves the problem cited by the advocates of special low tax rates for capital gains. So why do they push that solution aside? The answer is that it would not permit real gains to escape taxation at the same rate that wages are taxed, and the advocates of special low tax rates for capital gains and dividends are intent on taxing labor at higher rates. Why? It’s not difficult to figure out that taxing labor at high rates and investment income at low rates speeds up the growth of income inequality and shuts down the upward mobility that tax-cut and tax-elimination advocates claim is their goal.
The architects of this discrimination in federal income taxation did not stop with the high-tax-on-wages-and-low-tax-on-capital-gains plan. They also figured out how to turn certain wages into capital gain. It’s something that can be done if one is wealthy enough to play the partnership carried interest game, and it’s not something available to the everyday laborer. Put simply, by performing services and taking compensation in the form of a partnership interest, the wealthy worker delays taxation and when taxation finally occurs, the income has been turned into capital gains because it comes in the form of selling a partnership interest. Oddly, if a not-so-wealthy worker is compensated by a corporate employer with stock, the value of the stock is taxed as ordinary income, and unless the employee elects to be taxed when the stock is received, the value of the stock when substantial restrictions on it cease at some point in the future is included in gross income at that future time, and it is entirely ordinary income taxed at regular rates. Though arguments have been made that it’s perfectly acceptable to treat the two workers differently, deeper analysis of the arguments reveals a lack of symmetry in the comparisons and in the opportunities available to the service providers. Their argument would be more logical if the recipients of carried interests faced the same choices as those facing a typical employee, namely, taxed on ordinary income immediately, with capital gains rates for subsequent value increases, or taxed entirely on ordinary income in the future. At the moment, carried interest recipients are not taxed immediately and are taxed in the future on capital gains. Thus, a good bit of their argument reflects the often-used approach of under-compensating investors and business owners so that larger amounts of capital gains and dividends are available to the investor and business owner, to be taxed at lower rates, and, as icing on the cake, to escape employment taxes such as social security.
Of course, as everyone experienced with the federal income tax knows, at least one-third of tax law complexity and one-third of the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations, and some meaningful chunk of audit time and litigation would disappear if the special low tax rate for capital gains disappeared. The focus of the argument ought not be on whether that should be done, but on whether the revenue impact should be permitted to play out in the form of lower overall tax rates or be used to deal with the portion of the federal budget deficit attributable to the reduction in capital gains rates that contributed to the income inequality that in turn prevents the revival of the American economy. It’s no secret that I would vote to ameliorate the impact of the fiscal foolishness of the first eight years of the past decade.