A recent case,
Okonkwo v. Comr., T.C. Memo 2015-181, illustrates how the tax law sometimes is simple to apply and sometimes rather complicated to explain. The Internal Revenue Code provision under consideration was section 280A. Those who have studied it, including thousands of bewildered tax students, ought not be surprised that it is both simple and complex.
The taxpayers, a married couple, were respectively a cardiologist and an employee in the cardiology practice. They lived in the Bel Air secton of Los Angeles. In 1992, they purchased a vacant lot in Woodland Hills, in 1997 built a house on the property, and then tried to sell it. Failing to do so, in 2002 they gave up trying to sell it, and rented it for $6,000 per month to an unrelated tenant. Whenthe tenant moved out in 2007, the taxpayers’ daughter moved into the house and paid rent of $2,000 per month, while the taxpayers resumed trying to sell the property.
The taxpayers’ federal income tax returns were prepared by a certified public accountant. He used estimates of deductions that the cardiologist taxpayer provided. On the 2008 return, the taxpayers included a Schedule E, characterizing the Woodland Hills property as rental real estate, reported rent of $24,000, expenses of $158,360, and a net loss of $134,360. The expenses included mortgage interest, taxes, insurance, and depreciation. The loss was characterized as passive.
When he was getting ready to prepare the taxpayers’ returns for 2009 and 2010, the accountant asked the taxpayers about the significant decrease in rental income. The taxpayers explained that the previous tenant had left and their daughter had moved in. On the 2009 and 2010 returns, the gross receipts of $24,000 and $6,000, respectively, expenses of $108,600 and $113,820, respectively, and net losses of $84,600 and $107,820, respectively, were reported on Schedule C, not Schedule E. The taxpayers indicated that they were in the construction business and that the receipts and expenses were attributable to that business.
When the IRS initially examined the return, the taxpayers, following the accountant’s advice, filed an amended return for 2008, shifting the receipts attributable to the Woodland Hills property from Schedule E to Schedule C, claiming a refund. The IRS subsequently issued a notice of deficiency, rejecting the refund claim, disallowing $19,211 of mortgage interest expenses claimed as a deduction for the Bel Air property, and imposing the accuracy-related penalty. Thereafter, the IRS issued another notice of deficiency, for 2009 and 2010, disallowing the Schedule C deductions, adjusting deductions related to the Bel Air residence, and adjusting a deduction for retirement contributions. The IRS determined that the Woodland Hills house was held for the production of income, that the losses were passive, that the taxpayers owed income tax, and that the accuracy-related penalty should be imposed.
The taxpayers filed a petition with the Tax Court. The IRS filed an answer, and subsequently amended the answer to allege that the deductions were limited under section 280A to the amount of the taxpayers’ rental income. The IRS argued that section 280A applied because the taxpayers’ daughter lived in the Woodland Hills house during the years in issue. The taxpayers argued that section 280A did not apply because they were real estate developers and the insurance company providing the homeowners policy required the house to be occupied.
The court held that the daughter’s use of the house was personal and that under section 280A(d)(1) and (2)(A) was attributable to the taxpayers. Accordingly, they did not qualify for an exception to the provision in section 280A(d)(1) that treated the daughter’s use as use of the dwelling unit as a residence. Accordingly, section 280A(a) applied, disallowing the deductions. The court then cited section 280A(c)(5) to concluded that “deductions relating to the Woodland Hills house are limited to the extent of rental income.”
The court imposed the accuracy-related penalty because the taxpayers “did not make a reasonable attempt to comply with the law or maintain adequate books and records relating to their 2008 return.” The 2008 penalty, however, related to the interest deduction on the Bel Air residence, not the Woodland Hills property, and the taxpayers and accountant acknowledged that the deduction was based on the cardiologist taxpayer’s estimate. When it came to the 2009 and 2010 returns, the court sustained the penalty to the extent it related to itemized deductions also based on estimates, but held that with respect to the Woodland Hills property the taxpayers relied in good faith on the accountant’s judgment that the expenses related to that property were fully deductible.
The simple part of the case is that, indeed, the taxpayers were not in the construction or real estate development business and that section 280A applied. The complex part of the case is the absence of any reference to section 280A(b). That provision permits the taxpayers to deduct mortgage interest and real estate taxes even if they exceed the rental income. There are three possibilities to consider. First, perhaps the interest and taxes did not exceed the rental income. That is unlikely, especially in 2010 when the rental income was merely $6,000. Second, the taxpayers failed to raise the section 280A(b) issue. Third, the court simply overlooked section 280A(b). That the taxpayers represented themselves certainly did not improve the chances of section 280A(b) getting attention.
Section 280A is simple in part and complicated in part. The statement by the court, citing section 280A(c)(5), that “deductions relating to the Woodland Hills house are limited to the extent of rental income” is true only if the mortgage interest and real estate taxes on that property were less than the rental income, which I doubt was the case. Otherwise, section 280A(c)(5) is far more complex and cannot be explained correctly in a short sentence. When I teach basic federal income tax, it requires three Powerpoint slides to illustrate how section 280A(c)(5) works, in part because the concept is not simple and in part because the language of paragraph (5) is dense and inexplicably convoluted. My attempt to translate the provision into English reduces the complexity but cannot eliminate it because the concept underlying section 280A(c)(5) is complicated. It is not difficult to imagine why the taxpayers in this case, and perhaps the court, got lost in the maze of section 280A.