But, for me, there are disadvantages to watching television court shows. There are so many of them that sometimes I get fooled. How? The other day I noticed the word “tax” in the cable guide, so I paid close attention. It was episode 63 of season 6 of Hot Bench. It began well, with one judge opening the proceedings by describing the case as involving “the thing Americans fear most, being audited by the government.” As I watched and started taking notes, I realized, “Wait! I’ve seen this episode. I think I blogged it.” I checked. Indeed, I had, in, When the Tax Software Goes Awry.
But it wasn’t a total loss of a blogging opportunity. As I watched the episode, a thought occurred to me that had not crossed my mind when I wrote about the case in November of last year. Before describing that thought, I will share the facts of the case as I summarized them last November:
The plaintiffs, a married couple, sued the accountant who prepared their federal and state tax returns. The Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Revenue, after noticing larger than usual deductions and credits, contacted taxpayers, asking for an explanation. In turn, the plaintiffs contacted the defendant, who examined the returns and concluded there had been a software error.As I listened, I began to think more carefully about the decision to issue a decision in favor of the plaintiffs for the amount of the interest they had been required to pay.
The defendant explained to the court that when he examined the returns, he figured out that the software pulled amounts from the federal return onto the state return, generating erroneous deductions and credits. He also explained that when he spoke to someone at the Department of Revenue, that person informed him that thousands of Virginia taxpayers had been affected by this software glitch. Accordingly, the Department of Revenue waived all penalties but did not have the authority to waive interest.
The plaintiffs argued that the defendant should have noticed the error before filing the returns, and wanted him to pay the entire amount demanded by the Department of Revenue. The defendant replied that it was an error by the software and not his fault. He also pointed out that he was willing to pay the interest owed by the plaintiffs, but that during negotiations the plaintiffs refused that offer because they wanted him to pay the entire amount due, including the tax.
The court concluded that the defendant had not acted intentionally or maliciously and that the tax that was due was an obligation of the taxpayers that they would have paid on time had the software error not occurred. Accordingly, the court held that the defendant was liable for the interest.
In one sense, the defendant’s statement that he was willing to pay the interest tilted the judges’ decision. What would have happened had the defendant not agreed to pay the interest but had refused any obligation to do so?
Yes, it is possible to argue that the defendant’s software error, or more accurately, failure to notice and do something about the error, was the reason that the plaintiffs incurred interest charges, and that the defendant should reimburse the plaintiffs. Had there been no error, the plaintiffs would not have received a larger refund than that to which they would have otherwise been entitled.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs received the use of an excess refund for the time between when their account was credited with the excess refund and when they repaid the excess refund. So though they had to pay interest, they had the use of the money. In effect, they borrowed money. Suppose they had invested the money and earned interest or other income. In that event, how could they claim that they suffered damages, unless the interest rate charged by Virginia exceeded the rate of return they earned on their investment? Imagine borrowing money, investing it, making a return, and having someone else pay the interest on the loan. Even if they consumed the excess refund, for example, by taking a vacation, they were able to do something they otherwise would have been unable to do, because they had the use of money that wasn’t theirs and that they were obligated to repay. Using someone else’s money has value, measured by the interest charged by the lender.
Had I been representing the defendant, from the outset, I would have cautioned him about the dangers of offering to pay the interest, especially when the defendant’s clients wanted him to pay the excess refund. Once the case went to trial, I would have advised the defendant not to disclose the negotiations that failed to lead to a settlement. I also would have argued that the plaintiffs, by having the use of the money, did not suffer damages when they were required to pay interest on the borrowed money. I would have asked the plaintiffs to disclose what they did with the excess refund when it was received.
I don’t know if my approach would have spared the defendant from paying the interest. But I certainly would have taken that position, made the argument, and advised the defendant not to disclose he had offered to pay the interest.