Many people, including law students who approach enrollment in a basic federal income tax course, think and often fear that tax is nothing more than manipulating numbers. Of course, that’s not the case. Though numbers are used in tax, just as they are used in other areas of law and life, numbers are just a tiny part of what tax practitioners do. I wrote about this in
Why Tax Practitioners Must Be Good With Words, and Not Just Numbers. I offered examples of tax issues in which words were in play mattered and numbers were on the sideline in posts such as
Medical Expense Deductions for Embryo and Cord Blood Storage,
Pets and the Section 119 Meals Exclusion, and
Not That More Proof Is Needed, But Here’s Another Example That Taxes Aren’t “Just Numbers”.
Today one of my tax-related email alerts drew my attention to another example of why tax is much more than just numbers. In Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refining and Marketing, LLC v. U.S., 2022-1834 (Fed. Cir. 3 Jan. 2024), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Claims Court that a mixture of butane and gasoline did not qualify for the alternative fuel mixture credit. That credit is designed to offset the excise tax on alternative fuels. There also is an excise tax on taxable fuels, which by definition are not alternative fuels. An example of a taxable fuel is gasoline. Examples of an alternative fuels include benzol, benzene, and liquefied petroleum gases. The petroleum industry treats butane generally as a liquefied petroleum gas.
About ten years after Congress enacted the credit, the taxpayer filed refund claims for each taxable quarter in the years 2014 through 2017, claiming that it paid excise taxes on a mixture of butane and gasoline, and that it was entitled to an alternative fuel mixture credit to offset those taxes. It argued that the mixture in question was an alternative fuel. The IRS did not respond to the taxpayer’s filing so the taxpayer sued for a refund in the Claims Court. The Claims Court denied the taxpayer’s claim, holding that butane is not an alternative fuel and that a mixture of butane with gasoline is not an alternative fuel.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that although this was the first time it had faced the question, two other Courts of Appeal had done so and had held as did the Claims Court. Somehow I did not notice those other two Court of Appeals decisions.
The Court of Appeals explained that under the statutory definition, an alternative fuel mixture is “a mixture of alternative fuel and taxable fuel (as defined in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of section 4083(a)(1)) which—
(A) is sold by the taxpayer producing such mixture to any person for use as fuel, or (B) is used as a fuel by the taxpayer producing such mixture.” The Court explained that there was no dispute between the parties that gasoline is a taxable fuel. Under the statute, taxable fuel “means—(A) gasoline . . . .” The parties also did not dispute that under the same definition, butane is a taxable fuel, because the statute provides that the term gasoline includes “any gasoline blend stock.” The regulations under the statute state that gasoline blend stocks “means (A) Alkylate; (B) Butane; (C) Butene; . . . .” Accordingly, because both gasoline and butane are not alternative fuels, a mixture of the two is not an alternative fuel because an alternative fuel requires a mixture of a taxable fuel and an alternative fuel.
Nonetheless, the taxpayer argued that the credit should apply to the mixture because liquified petroleum gas is included in the definition of alternative fuel, and under industry understandings, butane is a liquified petroleum gas. The taxpayer argued that because the Congress did not provide a cross-reference in the credit statute to the definition of alternative fuel even though it provided a cross-reference to the definition of taxable fuel, it must have intended that the definition of alternative fuel for purposes of the credit was not the same as the definition of alternative fuel for purposes of the excise tax on alternative fuels. The taxpayer pointed out that the definition of alternative fuel in the credit statute states that alternative fuel “means—(A) liquefied petroleum gas, (B) P Series Fuels . . . .” Accordingly, argued the taxpayer, because the statute did not define liquified petroleum gas for purposes of the credit, the definition should reflect the industry understanding that it includes butane. The Court rejected the argument because even though looking at the credit statute in isolation it might appear that the taxpayer had a point, the analysis required looking at the “statutes as a whole,” which makes it clear that butane is not an alternative fuel. This conclusion was buttressed by the fact that a taxable fuel, such as butane, was by definition excluded from the definition of alternative fuel.
There are several lessons to be learned from this case. First, as pointed out at the beginning of this post, tax practice is more than dealing with numbers. Second, as I’ve pointed out many times, those who practice tax end up dealing with everything in life, not just meal exclusions, medical expense deductions, and similar transactions, but also the definition of fuels. Third, though law students think accounting majors “have the edge for grades” in the basic federal income tax course, they don’t, but perhaps when it comes to the alternative fuel credit chemistry majors would have an advantage but for the fact that no basic federal income tax course of which I’m aware covers these taxes (not only because it is a complex and specialized area but also because it involves an excise tax). Fourth, to no one’s surprise, once again we are blessed with an example of inadequate statutory drafting by the Congress, reinforced by the fact that after the years in issue in the case Congress amended the statute to provide that a mixture of gasoline and butane is not an alternative fuel.